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Abstract
In the network design game with n players, every player chooses a path in an edge-
weighted graph to connect her pair of terminals, sharing costs of the edges on her path with
all other players fairly. We study the price of stability of the game, i.e., the ratio of the
social costs of a best Nash equilibrium (with respect to the social cost) and of an optimal
play. It has been shown that the price of stability of any network design game is at most
Hn, the n-th harmonic number. This bound is tight for directed graphs. For undirected
graphs, the situation is dramatically different, and tight bounds are not known. It has
only recently been shown that the price of stability is at most Hn
(
1− 1Θ(n4)
)
, while the
worst-case known example has price of stability around 2.25. In this paper we improve the
upper bound considerably by showing that the price of stability is at most Hn/2 +  for any
 starting from some suitable n ≥ n().
Keywords: Network design game, Nash equilibrium, Price of Stability
1 Introduction
Network design game was introduced by Anshelevich et al. [1] together with the notion of price
of stability (PoS), as a formal model to study and quantify the strategic behavior of non-
cooperative agents in designing communication networks. Network design game with n players
is given by an edge-weighted graph G (where n does not stand for the number of vertices), and
by a collection of n terminal (source-target) pairs {si, ti}, i = 1, . . . , n. In this game, every
player i connects its terminals si and ti by an si-ti path Pi, and pays for each edge e on the
path a fair share of its cost (i.e., all players using the edge pay the same amount totalling to
the cost of the edge). A Nash equilibrium of the game is an outcome (P1, . . . , Pn) in which no
player i can pay less by changing Pi to a different path P
′
i .
Nash equilibria of the network design game can be quite different from an optimal outcome
that could be created by a central authority. To quantify the difference in quality of equilibria
and optima, one compares the total cost of a Nash equilibrium to the cost of an optimum (with
respect to the total cost). Taking the worst-case approach, one arrives at the price of anarchy,
which is the ratio of the maximum cost of any Nash equilibrium to the cost of an optimum.
∗This paper will appear in the Proceedings of the 39th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations
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Price of anarchy of network design games can be as high as n (but not higher) [1]. Taking the
slightly less pessimistic approach leads to the notion of the price of stability, which is the ratio
of the smallest cost of any Nash equilibrium to the cost of an optimum. The motivation behind
this is that often a central authority exists, but cannot force the players into actions they do not
like. Instead, a central authority can suggest to the players actions that correspond to a best
Nash equilibria. Then, no player wants to deviate from the action suggested to her, and the
overall cost of the outcome can be lowered (when compared to the worst case Nash equilibria).
Network design games belong to the broader class of congestion games for which a function
(called a potential function) Φ(P1, . . . , Pn) exists, with the property that Φ(P1 . . . , Pi, . . . , Pn)−
Φ(P1, . . . , P
′
i , . . . , Pn) exactly reflects the changes of the cost of any player i switching from Pi
to P ′i . This property implies that a collection of paths (P1, . . . , Pn) minimizing Φ necessarily
needs to be a Nash equilibrium. Up to an additive constant, every congestion game has a unique
potential function of a concrete form, which can be used to show that the price of stability of
any network design game is at most Hn :=
∑n
i=1
1
i , the n-th harmonic number, and this is
tight for directed graphs (i.e., there is a network design game for which the price of stability is
arbitrarily close to Hn) [1].
Obtaining tight bounds on the price of stability for undirected graphs turned out to be much
more difficult. The worst case known example is an involved construction of a game by Bilo` et
al. [4] achieving in the limit the price of stability of around 2.25. While the general upper bound
of Hn applies also for undirected graphs, it has not been known for a long time whether it can
be any lower, until the recent work of Disser et al. [7] who showed that the price of stability of
any network design game with n players is at most Hn ·
(
1− 1
Θ(n4)
)
. Improved upper bounds
have been obtained for special cases. For the case where all terminals ti are the same, Li showed
[10] that the price of stability is at most O
(
logn
log logn
)
(note that Hn is approximately lnn). If,
additionally, every vertex of the graph is a source of a player, a series of papers by Fiat et al. [9],
Lee and Ligett [12], and Bilo` et al. [5] showed that the price of stability is in this case at most
O(log log n), O(log log log n), and O(1), respectively. Fanelli et al. [8] restrict the graphs to be
rings, and prove that the price of stability is at most 3/2. Further special cases concern the
number of players. Interestingly, tight bounds on price of stability are known only for n = 2
(we do not consider the case n = 1 as a game) [1, 6], while for already 3 players there are no
tight bounds; for the most recent results for the case n = 3, see [7] and [3].
All obtained upper bounds on the price of stability use the potential function in one way
or another. Our paper is not an exception in that aspect. Bounding the price of stabil-
ity translates effectively into bounding the cost of a best Nash equilibrium. A common ap-
proach is to bound this cost by the cost of the potential function minimizer (PΦ1 , . . . , P
Φ
n ) :=
arg min(P1,...,Pn) Φ(P1, . . . , Pn), which is (as we argued above) also a Nash equilibrium. Using
just the inequality Φ(PΦ1 , . . . , P
Φ
n ) ≤ Φ(PO1 , . . . , POn ), where (PO1 , . . . , POn ) is an optimal out-
come (minimizing the total cost of having all pairs of terminals connected), one obtains the
original upper bound Hn on the price of stability [1]. In [7, 6] authors consider other inequal-
ities obtained from the property that potential optimizer is also a Nash equilibrium to obtain
improved upper bounds. In this paper, we consider n different specifically chosen strategy pro-
files (P i1, . . . , P
i
n), i = 1, . . . , n, in which players use only edges of the optimum (P
O
1 , . . . , P
O
n )
and of the Nash equilibrium (PΦ1 , . . . , P
Φ
n ). This idea is a generalization of the approach used
by Bilo` and Bove [3] to prove an upper bound of 286/175 ≈ 1.634 for Shapley network design
games with 3 players. Clearly, the potential of each of the considered strategy profile is at
least the potential of (PΦ1 , . . . , P
Φ
n ). Summing all these n inequalities and combining it with
the original inequality Φ(PΦ1 , . . . , P
Φ
n ) ≤ Φ(PO1 , . . . , POn ) gives an asymptotic upper bound of
Hn/2 +  on the price of stability. Our result thus shows that the price of stability is strictly
2
lower than Hn by an additive constant (namely, by log 2).
Albeit the idea is simple, the analysis is not. It involves carefully chosen strategy profiles for
various possible topologies of the optimum solution. These considerations can be of independent
interest in further attempts to improve the bounds on the price of stability of network design
games.
2 Preliminaries
Shapley network design game is a strategic game of n players played on an edge-weighted graph
G = (V,E) with non-negative edge costs ce, e ∈ E. Each player i, i = 1, . . . , n, has a source
node si and a target node ti. All si-ti paths form the set Pi of the strategies of player i. A vector
P = (P1, . . . , Pn) ∈ P1 × · · · × Pn is called a strategy profile. Let E(P ) :=
⋃n
i=1 Pi be the set of
all edges used in P . The cost of player i in a strategy profile P is costi(P ) =
∑
e∈Pi ce/ke(P ),
where ke(P ) = |{j|e ∈ Pj}| is the number of players using edge e in P . A strategy profile
N = (N1, . . . , Nn) is a Nash equilibrium if no player i can unilaterally switch from her strategyNi
to a different strategy N ′i ∈ Pi and decrease her cost, i.e., costi(N) ≤ costi(N1, . . . , N ′i , . . . , Nn)
for every N ′i ∈ Pi.
Shapley network design games are exact potential games. That is, there is a so called poten-
tial function Φ : P1×· · ·×Pn → R such that, for every strategy profile P , every player i, and ev-
ery alternative strategy P ′i , costi(P )−costi(P1, . . . , P ′i , . . . , Pn) = Φ(P )−Φ(P1, . . . , P ′i , . . . , Pn).
Up to an additive constant, the potential function is unique [13], and is defined as
Φ(P ) =
∑
e∈E(P )
ke(P )∑
i=1
ce/i =
∑
e∈E(P )
Hke(P ) ce .
To simplify the notation (e.g., to avoid writing Hdn/2e), we extend Hk also for non-integer values
of k by setting H(k) :=
∫ 1
0
1−xk
1−x dx, which is an increasing function, and which agrees with the
(original) k-th harmonic number whenever k is an integer.
The social cost of a strategy profile P is defined as the sum of the player costs:
cost(P ) =
n∑
i=1
costi(P ) =
n∑
i=1
∑
e∈Pi
ce/ke(P ) =
∑
e∈E(P )
ke(P ) ce/ke(P ) =
∑
e∈E(P )
ce. (1)
A strategy profile O(G) that minimizes the social cost of a game G is called a social optimum.
Observe that a social optimum O(G) so that E(O(G)) induces a forest always exists (if there
is a cycle, we could remove one of its edges without increasing the social cost). Let N (G)
be the set of Nash equilibria of a game G. The price of stability of a game G is the ratio
PoS(G) = minN∈N (G) cost(N)/cost(O(G)).
LetM(G) be the set of Nash equilibria that are also global minimizers of the potential func-
tion Φ of the game. The potential-optimal price of anarchy of a game G, introduced by Kawase
and Makino [11], is defined as POPoA(G) = maxN∈M(G) cost(N)/cost(O(G)). Properties of
potential optimizers were earlier observed and exploited by Asadpour and Saberi in [2] for other
games.
SinceM(G) ⊂ N (G), it follows that PoS(G) ≤ POPoA(G). Let G(n) be the set of all Shap-
ley network design games with n players. The price of stability of Shapley network design games
is defined as PoS(n) = supG∈G(n) PoS(G). The quantity POPoA(n) is defined analogously, and
we get that PoS(n) ≤ POPoA(n).
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3 The ≈ Hn/2 upper bound
The main result of the paper is the new upper bound on the price of stability, as stated in the
following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. PoS(n) ≤ Hn/2 + , for any  > 0 given that n ≥ n() for some suitable n().
We consider a Nash equilibrium N that minimizes the potential function Φ. For each player
i we construct a strategy profile Si as follows. Every player j 6= i, whenever possible (the
terminals of players i and j lie in the same connected component of the optimum O), uses edges
of E(O(G)) to reach si, from there it uses the Nash equilibrium strategy (a path) of player i to
reach ti, and from there it again uses edges of E(O(G)) to reach the player j’s other terminal
node. From the definition of N , we then obtain the inequality Φ(N) ≤ Φ(Si). We then combine
these n inequalities in a particular way with the inequality Φ(N) ≤ Φ(O(G)), and obtain the
claimed upper bound on the cost of N .
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is structured in the following way. We first prove the theorem
for the special case where an optimum O(G) contains an edge that is used by every player. We
then extend the proof of this special case, first to the case where E(O(G)) is a tree, but with
no edge used by every player, and, second, to the case where E(O(G)) is a general forest (i.e.,
not one connected component).
We will use the following notation. For a strategy profile P = (P1, . . . , Pn) and a set
U ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, we denote by PU the set of edges e ∈ E for which {j|e ∈ Pj} = U and by P l
the set of edges e ∈ E for which |{j|e ∈ Pj}| = l. That is, PU is the set of edges used in P
by exactly the players U , and P l =
⋃
U⊂{1,...,n}
|U|=l
PU is the set of edges used by exactly l many
players. Then the edges used by player i in P are
⋃
U⊂{1,...,n}
i∈U
PU . We stress that for every player
i ∈ U , the edges of PU are part of the strategy Pi; this implies that, whenever E(P ) induces a
forest, the source si and the target ti are in two different connected components of E(P ) \ PU .
For any set of edges F ⊂ E, let |F | := ∑e∈F ce. We then have, for instance, that the cost of
player i in P is given by costi(P ) =
∑
U⊂{1,...,n}
i∈U
|PU |
|U | .
From now on, G is an arbitrary Shapley network design game with n players, N = (N1, . . . , Nn)
is a Nash equilibrium minimizing the potential function and O = (O1, . . . , On) is an arbitrary
social optimum so that E(O) has no cycles.
3.1 Case On is not empty
In this section we assume that On is not empty. In this case, E(O) is actually a tree. Then,
E(O)\On is formed by two disconnected trees, which we call O− and O+, such that each player
has the source node in one tree and the target node in the other tree (see also Fig. 1). Without
loss of generality, assume that all source nodes si are in O
−. Given two players i and j, let ui,j
be the first1 edge of Oi∩Oj and vi,j be the last edge of Oi∩Oj . Notice that every edge between
si and ui,j is used in O by player i but not by player j. That is, each edge e between si and ui,j
satisfies e ∈ Oi and e /∈ Oj , or equivalently, e ∈
⋃
U⊂{1,...,n}
i∈U,j /∈U
OU . An analogous statement holds
for each edge e between ti and vi,j .
For every player i, we define a strategy profile Si, where player j = 1, . . . , n uses the following
sj-tj path S
i
j (see Fig. 1 for an example.):
1. From sj to ui,j , it uses edges of O
−.
2. From ui,j to si, it uses edges of O
−.
1the edges are ordered naturally along the path from si to ti
4
On
si
tj
sj ti
ui,j vi,jO− O+
Figure 1: The non dashed lines are the edges of E(O), the dashed line is the Nash strategy
Ni. The path S
i
j from sj to tj is given by the thicker dashed and non dashed lines.
3. From si to ti, it uses edges of Ni.
4. From ti to vi,j , it uses edges of O
+.
5. From vi,j to tj , it uses edges of O
+.
Observe that for j = i, the path Sii is just the path Ni from the Nash equilibrium N . Then,
Si = (Si1, . . . , S
i
n).
If Sij contains cycles, we skip them to obtain a simple path from sj to tj . This can be the
case if Ni is not disjoint from E(O), so that an edge appears both in step 3 and in one of the
steps 1, 2, 4 or 5. Observe that the path Sij uses exactly the edges of OU for i ∈ U, j /∈ U (in
steps 2 and 4), the edges of OU for i /∈ U, j ∈ U (in steps 1 and 5) and the edges of NU for
i ∈ U (in step 3). We now can prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. For every i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
Φ(N) ≤ Φ(Si) ≤
∑
U⊂{1,...,n}
i∈U
Hn|NU |+
∑
U⊂{1,...,n}
i∈U
Hn−|U ||OU |+
∑
U⊂{1,...,n}
i/∈U
H|U ||OU |. (2)
Proof. The first inequality of (2) holds because, by assumption, N is a global minimum of the
potential function Φ.
To prove the second inequality, recall that for any strategy profile P we can write Φ(P ) =∑
e∈P Hke(P )ce =
∑
U⊂{1,...,n}H|U ||PU |. In our case, every edge e ∈ Si belongs either to NU ,
U ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, i ∈ U , or to OU , and we therefore sum only over these terms. We now show
that, in our sum, the cost ce of every edge e in S
i is accounted for with at least coefficient
Hke(Si).
For the first sum in the right hand side of (2), obviously at most n players can use an edge
of NU , i ∈ U , i.e., ke(Si) ≤ n. To explain the second and third sums, notice that if an edge
e ∈ OU that is present in Si also belongs to Ni, its cost is already accounted for in the first sum.
So, we just have to look at edges that are only present in steps 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the definition of
Sij .
To explain the second sum, let i ∈ U . Then, as we already noted, in the definition of Sij ,
player j uses edges of OU with i ∈ U only if j /∈ U (in steps 2 and 4). Since there are exactly
n− |U | players that satisfy j /∈ U , this explains the second sum.
Finally, to explain the third sum, let i /∈ U . Similarly to the previous argument, in the
definition of Sij , player j uses edges of OU with i /∈ U only if j ∈ U (in steps 1 and 5). Since
there are exactly |U | players that satisfy j ∈ U , this explains the third sum.
5
We now show how to combine Lemma 3.2 with the inequality Φ(N) ≤ Φ(O) to prove
Theorem 3.1, whenever On 6= ∅.
Lemma 3.3. Suppose that Inequality (2) holds for every i. Then, for x = n−HnHn−1 ,
PoS(G) ≤ n+ x
n+ x−HnHn+x2 ≤ Hn/2 + 
holds for any  > 0, given that n ≥ n() for some suitable n().
Proof. We sum (2) for i = 1, . . . , n to obtain
nΦ(N) ≤
n∑
i=1
 ∑
U⊂{1,...,n}
i∈U
Hn|NU |+
∑
U⊂{1,...,n}
i∈U
Hn−|U ||OU |+
∑
U⊂{1,...,n}
i/∈U
H|U ||OU |
 =
=
∑
U⊂{1,...,n}
|U |Hn|NU |+
∑
U⊂{1,...,n}
|U |Hn−|U ||OU |+
∑
U⊂{1,...,n}
(n− |U |)H|U ||OU | =
=
n∑
l=1
lHn|N l|+
n∑
l=1
(lHn−l + (n− l)Hl)|Ol| .
Since Φ(N) =
∑n
l=1Hl|N l|, by putting all terms relating to N on the left hand side we obtain
n∑
l=1
(nHl − lHn)|N l| ≤
n∑
l=1
(lHn−l + (n− l)Hl)|Ol| . (3)
On the other hand, we have Φ(N) ≤ Φ(O), which we can write as
n∑
l=1
Hl|N l| ≤
n∑
l=1
Hl|Ol| . (4)
If we multiply (4) by x = n−HnHn−1 and sum it with (3) we get
n∑
l=1
((n+ x)Hl − lHn)|N l| ≤
n∑
l=1
(lHn−l + ((n+ x)− l)Hl)|Ol| . (5)
Let α(l) = (n+x)Hl−lHn and β(l) = lHn−l+((n+x)−l)Hl. We will show that minl∈{1,...,n} α(l) =
n+ x−Hn and that maxl∈{1,...,n} β(l) ≤ (n+ x)Hn+x
2
. This will allow us to bound the left and
right hand side of (5), giving us the desired bound on the price of stability.
To prove minl∈{1,...,n} α(l) = n+x−Hn, we show that α(l) first increases and then decreases
and that α(1) = α(n). We have
α(l + 1)− α(l) = (n+ x)Hl+1 − (l + 1)Hn − ((n+ x)Hl − lHn) =
= (n+ x)Hl +
n+ x
l + 1
− lHn −Hn − (n+ x)Hl + lHn = n+ x
l + 1
−Hn.
The difference is positive when l + 1 ≤ n+xHn , which proves that α first increases and then
decreases and implies that the minimum is at one of the extremes l = 1 or l = n. Is it easy
to check that by the choice of x the values at the two extremes coincide, and the minimum is
α(1) = n+ x−Hn.
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To prove maxl∈{1,...,n} β(l) ≤ (n+ x)Hn+x
2
, we first show that θ(l) = lHn−l + (n− l)Hl has
maximum nHn/2. Since θ is symmetric around n/2, we just have to show that the difference
θ(l + 1) − θ(l) is always positive for l + 1 ≤ n/2. This proves that θ reaches at l = n/2 the
maximum value of n2Hn/2 +
n
2Hn/2 = nHn/2. We have that
θ(l + 1)− θ(l) = (l + 1)Hn−(l+1) + (n− (l + 1))Hl+1 − (lHn−l + (n− l)Hl) =
= lHn−l +Hn−l − l + 1
n− (l + 1) + (n− l)Hl −Hl +
n− (l + 1)
l + 1
− lHn−l − (n− l)Hl =
=
n− (l + 1)
l + 1
− l + 1
n− (l + 1) +Hn−l −Hl.
The term n−(l+1)l+1 − l+1n−(l+1) is positive if n− (l+ 1) ≥ l+ 1, that is if l+ 1 ≤ n/2. Since H is an
increasing function, Hn−l −Hl is positive if l ≤ n/2, in particular if l + 1 ≤ n/2. This proves
our claim that θ(l) = lHn−l + (n− l)Hl has maximum nHn/2.
Since H is an increasing function, we then have the bound
β(l) = lHn−l + ((n+ x)− l)Hl ≤ lH(n+x)−l + ((n+ x)− l)Hl ≤ (n+ x)Hn+x
2
.
We can now finally prove Lemma 3.3. We know that
(n+ x−Hn) cost(N) = (n+ x−Hn)
n∑
l=1
|N l| ≤
n∑
l=1
((n+ x)Hl − lHn)|N l| , (6)
n∑
l=1
(lHn−l + ((n+ x)− l)Hl)|Ol| ≤ (n+ x)Hn+x
2
n∑
l=1
|Ol| = (n+ x)Hn+x
2
cost(O) , (7)
which together with (5) proves that PoS(G) ≤ cost(N)cost(O) ≤ n+xn+x−HnHn+x2 .
Now observe that for any  there is an n() so that n+xn+x−HnHn+x2 ≤ Hn/2 +  whenever
n ≥ n(), because x = n−HnHn−1 ∈ o(n) and (Hn)2 ∈ o(n).
3.2 Case On is empty
In the previous section we proved Theorem 3.1 if On 6= ∅ by constructing for every pair of
players i and j a particular path Sij that uses edges of E(O) to go from sj to si and from tj to
ti.
If E(O) is not connected, then there is a pair of players i, j for which si and sj are in different
connected components of E(O), and we cannot define the path Sij . Even if E(O) is connected,
but On = ∅, there might be a pair of players i and j for which the path Sij exists, but this path
is not optimal. See Fig. 6 for an example: the path Sij (before cycles are removed to make S
i
j a
simple path) traverses some edges of E(O) twice, including the edge denoted by e in the figure.
The same holds even if we exchange the labeling of si and ti. Thus, we may need to define a
new path T ij for some players i and j.
To define the new path T ij , let us introduce some notation. Given two players i, j and two
nodes xi ∈ {si, ti}, xj ∈ {sj , tj} in the same connected component of E(O), let O(xi, xj) be the
unique path in E(O) between xi and xj . If si and sj are in the same connected component of
E(O), let (T ij )
′ (respectively (T ij )
′′) be the following sj-tj path:
1′. From sj to si (respectively ti), it uses edges of O(si, sj) (respectively O(ti, sj)).
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2′. From si (respectively ti) to ti (respectively si), it uses edges of Ni.
3′. From ti (respectively si) to tj , it uses edges of O(ti, tj) (respectively O(si, tj)).
If (T ij )
′ or (T ij )
′′ contain cycles, we skip them to obtain a simple path from sj to tj . See Fig.
2 for an example of (T ij )
′ and Fig. 4 for an example of (T ij )
′′.
Notice that in the previous section, we had Sij = (T
i
j )
′ (where steps 1 and 2 are now step
1′; steps 4 and 5 are now step 3′) and O(si, sj) ∩ O(ti, tj) = ∅, since O(si, sj) ⊂ O− and
O(ti, tj) ⊂ O+. This ensured that there was no edge that is traversed both in step 1′ and 3′,
which would make Lemma 3.2 not hold. In general, O(si, sj) ∩ O(ti, tj) = ∅ does not have to
hold; for example in Fig. 6 we have e ∈ O(si, sj)∩O(ti, tj). We call the path (T ij )′ (respectively
(T ij )
′′) O-cycle free if O(si, sj) ∩ O(ti, tj) = ∅ (respectively if O(si, tj) ∩ O(ti, sj) = ∅). For
instance, in Fig. 6 both (T ij )
′ and (T ij )
′′ are not O-cycle free.
We are now ready to define the path T ij for two players i and j. If si and sj are in the
same connected component of E(O), we set T ij = (T
i
j )
′ (respectively T ij = (T
i
j )
′′) if (T ij )
′
(respectively (T ij )
′′) is O-cycle free. Otherwise, we set T ij = Oj . Similar to the previous section,
let T i = (T i1, . . . , T
i
n). That is, in T
i a player j uses the optimal path Oj if the paths (T
i
j )
′ and
(T ij )
′′ are not defined (meaning that si and sj are in different connected components of E(O)),
or if they are not O-cycle free (meaning that they use some edges of E(O) twice). Otherwise,
player j uses the O-cycle free path.
The following lemma shows that the paths T i satisfy the requirements of Lemma 3.3 if E(O)
is connected but On = ∅. A subsequent lemma will then show that the requirements of Lemma
3.3 are satisfied even if E(O) is not connected.
Lemma 3.4. If E(O) is connected, then for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
Φ(N) ≤ Φ(T i) ≤
∑
U⊂{1,...,n}
i∈U
Hn|NU |+
∑
U⊂{1,...,n}
i∈U
Hoi(U)|OU |+
∑
U⊂{1,...,n}
i/∈U
H|U ||OU | , (8)
with oi(U) ≤ n− |U |.
Proof. Since the initial part of the proof is exactly the same as the proof of Lemma 3.2, we only
prove that the cost ce of every edge e in T
i is accounted for with at least coefficient Hke(T i) in
the right hand side of (8). In particular, we just look at edges that are only present in steps 1′
and 3′ of the definition of T ij , since an edge e ∈ OU that also belongs to Ni has its cost already
accounted for in the first sum.
To explain the second and third sum, let U ⊂ {1, . . . , n} and e ∈ OU . We will look at all
the possibilities of where the nodes si, sj , ti and tj can be in the tree E(O) and see whether e
can be traversed in the path T ij . Denote by e
− and e+ the two distinct connected components
of E(O) \ {e}. Then, by the definition of OU , each player k ∈ U has sk ∈ e− and tk ∈ e+,
or viceversa. Always by the definition of OU , each player k /∈ U has either sk, tk ∈ e− or
sk, tk ∈ e+.
To explain the third sum of (8), let i /∈ U . For illustration purposes, assume without loss of
generality that si, ti ∈ e−. Then, the only possibilities are that
• j ∈ U . Then e can be traversed, since T ij has to go from e− to e+ to connect sj and tj .
See Fig. 2 for an illustration in the case T ij 6= Oj and Fig. 3 for the case T ij = Oj .
• j /∈ U, sj , tj ∈ e−. Then e cannot be traversed, since all terminal nodes are in e− and
there is no need to traverse e. See Fig. 4 for an illustration in the case T ij 6= Oj and Fig.
5 for the case T ij = Oj .
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• j /∈ U, sj , tj ∈ e+. Then e cannot be traversed, since both (T ij )′ and (T ij )′′ traverse e twice,
so we must have T ij = Oj . See Fig. 6 for an illustration.
As we can see, e can be traversed only if j ∈ U , that is, at most |U | times. This explains the
third sum of (8).
Finally, to explain the second sum of (8), let i ∈ U . The only possibilities are that
• j ∈ U . Then e cannot be traversed, since at least one of (T ij )′ or (T ij )′′ is a O-cycle free
path that does not traverse e. See Fig. 7 for an illustration.
• j /∈ U and T ij 6= Oj . Then e can be traversed, since sj and tj are in the same connected
component of E(O)\{e}, but si and ti are in different ones. See Fig. 8 for an illustration.
• j /∈ U and T ij = Oj . Then e cannot be traversed, since sj and tj are in the same connected
component of E(O) \ {e} and we just take the direct path between them, which does not
traverse e. See Fig. 9 for an illustration.
Let oi(U) be the number of j /∈ U with T ij 6= Oj . Then, as we can see, e is traversed at most
oi(U) ≤ n− |U | times. This explain the second sum of (8) and finishes the proof of Lemma 3.4.
Theorem 3.1 follows directly if E(O) is connected but On is empty by Lemma 3.4 and Lemma
3.3. The following lemma handles the last case we have left to analyze, which is when E(O) is
not a connected tree. This, together with Lemma 3.3, finishes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Lemma 3.5. Let E(O) = C1 unionsq · · · unionsq Cq, with each Cm being a connected component of E(O).
Let Rm be the set of players j with sj , tj ∈ Cm. Then for a player i ∈ Rk
Φ(N) ≤ Φ(T i) ≤
∑
U⊂{1,...,n}
i∈U
Hn|NU |+
∑
U⊂Rk
i∈U
Hoi(U)|OU |+
∑
U⊂Rm for some m
i/∈U
H|U ||OU | , (9)
with oi(U) ≤ |Tk| − |U | ≤ n− |U |.
Proof. Since the initial part of the proof is exactly the same as the proof of Lemma 3.2 and
Lemma 3.4, we only prove that the cost ce of every edge e in T
i is accounted for with at least
coefficient Hke(T i) in the right hand side of (9). In particular, we just look at edges that are
only present in steps 1′ and 3′ of the definition of T ij , since an edge e ∈ OU that also belongs to
Ni has its cost already accounted for in the first sum.
To explain the second and third sum, let U ⊂ {1, . . . , n} and e ∈ OU . Notice that if U 6⊂ Rm
for every m, then OU is the empty set and e does not contribute anything to Φ(T
i). We begin
by looking at the second sum.
Notice that since i ∈ Rk, the only possibility to have i ∈ U is that U ⊂ Rk. By the definition
of T i the players j ∈ Rm, m 6= k use the path Oj , which does not traverse e. With the exact
same reasoning of Lemma 3.4, by looking at all the possibilities of where si, ti, sj and tj can be
in Ck, we can see that e can be traversed by player j ∈ Rk only if j /∈ U and T i 6= Oj . If we
then define the number of players j ∈ Tk with this property to be oi(U) ≤ |Tk| − |U | ≤ n− |U |,
the second sum in the right hand side of (9) is explained.
Finally, for the third sum, we fix i /∈ U and look at the cases U ⊂ Rk and U ⊂ Rm, m 6= k
separately.
Suppose first that U ⊂ Rk. By the definition of T i the players j ∈ Rm, m 6= k use the path
Oj , which does not traverse e. With the exact same reasoning of Lemma 3.4, by looking at all
the possibilities of where si, ti, sj and tj can be in Ck, we can see that e can be traversed by
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esi
sj
ti
tj
e+e−
Figure 2: i /∈ U, j ∈ U and T ij 6= Oj . Then e
can be traversed in the path T ij .
e
si sj
ti
tj
e+e−
Figure 3: i /∈ U, j ∈ U and T ij = Oj . Then e
can be traversed in the path T ij .
e
sisj
ti
tj
e+e−
Figure 4: i /∈ U, j /∈ U , sj , tj ∈ e− and T ij 6=
Oj . Then e cannot be traversed in the path
T ij .
e
si sj
ti
tj
e+e−
Figure 5: i /∈ U, j /∈ U , sj , tj ∈ e− and T ij =
Oj . Then e cannot be traversed in the path
T ij .
e
si
ti
tj
sj
e+e−
Figure 6: i /∈ U, j /∈ U , sj , tj ∈ e+ and T ij =
Oj . Then e cannot be traversed in the path
T ij .
e
si
tj
sj ti
e+e−
Figure 7: i ∈ U, j ∈ U and T ij 6= Oj . Then e
cannot be traversed in the path T ij .
e
si
tj
sj ti
e+e−
Figure 8: i ∈ U, j /∈ U , and T ij 6= Oj . Then
e can be traversed in the path T ij .
e
si
tj
sj ti
e+e−
Figure 9: i ∈ U, j /∈ U , and T ij = Oj . Then
e cannot be traversed in the path T ij .
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player j ∈ Rk only if j ∈ U . That is, by at most |U | players. This explains the third sum for
the case U ⊂ Rk.
We now look at the case U ⊂ Rm, m 6= k. By the definition of T i, players j ∈ Rl, l 6= m
do not traverse e, since they only use edges of Cl (if l 6= k) or edges of Ck and of Ni (if l = k).
Players j ∈ Rm use the path Oj , and by the definition of OU exactly |U | players traverse e.
This explains the third sum for the case U ⊂ Rm, m 6= k, which finishes the proof.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we improved the upper bound on price of stability of undirected network design
games by analyzing potential minima and their properties. We hope that similar analysis can
be applied to multicast games to obtain much better asymptotic for the upper bound. It is
known that bounding the cost of potential minima cannot provide an upper bound on the price
of stability better than Θ(
√
log logn) [11]. It remains an open question, whether Θ(
√
log logn)
can actually be achieved.
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